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Regionalism in East and Southeast Asia*
 
Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt**
 
The emergence of exclusive regional blocs is concieved by many scholars and 
policymakers as a central feature in the contemporary international political 
economy. Some observers welcome it as a force for strengthening stability and 
world order at both the regional and the global level. Others view regionalism as 
a potentially disruptive force. This critique fear regionalization to increase 
economic friction and the adoption of begger-my-neighbor policies between 
blocs. One reason for these conflicting reactions is the various connotations 
related with the concept and the rise of a blurred understanding of regionalism 
as a residual category denoting an intermediate space between globalization, the 
state and the local where regions are merely seen as processes and not 
necessarily fixed orders. Furthermore the crisis of legitimacy of the global 
governance system (IMF, WB and WTO) and the fact that more and more 
processes and problems are transnationalized have contributed to the rise of 
what some sholars term “new, alternative or informal regionalism”.1
 
However, the purpose here is not to elaborate in detail or distinguish the 
different concepts and theories of 'regionalism' and 'regionalization'. A debate 
which, according to some scholars is still at the stage of “theoretical 
brainstorming”. This is further complicated by the fact that theories of regional 
integration, mainly derived from contemporary European experience are 
challenged by the success of informal, mostly open non-governmental networks 
in connecting East Asian sub-regions to one another. This is in contrast to the 
kind of intergovernmental arrangements that characterize the EU and NAFTA. 
Although ASEAN, APEC and other types of governmental initiatives such as a 
regional alternative to the IMF might be considered as opposing this view, these 
initiatives as suggested in this paper are primarily to be seen as reactive in the 
sense of being co-opted and subverted by the hegemony of neo-liberalism. 
 
This paper attempts to provide a tentative perspective on how Southeast Asian 
latecomers develop strategies and deliberately select state capacities and 
capabilities to implement efficient economic policies in order to catch-up in the 
global market-place and thus implicitly only emphasize the regional imperative 
as a serious option when it is convinient and if it doesn’t oppose the neoliberal 
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mainstream. Furthermore, it explores the link between national and collective 
responses to the emerging regionalism in the North and notice that exporting 
countries in East and Southeast Asia are debating various coherent regional and 
subregional responses in fear of rising regionalism and protectionism in the 
United States and Europe. Finally, the paper briefly touches on the impact of the 
financial crisis on regional labor markets and social policy. The paper relies on a 
simple model of three levels of analysis which are closely intertwined and thus 
cannot be separated except for analytical purposes: one is the corporate level 
which determines the hierarchy of production; a second level is the public sector 
level of state and government sponsored institutions; and finally, the informal 
level of actors and processes in civil society. 
 
2. Regionalization or liberalization 
Independently of the breakdown of the planned economies in Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union, two tendencies seem to be pursued simultaneously at the 
global level. One tendency is a push towards deregulation, liberalization and 
opening of markets in East Asia and the Third World, and the other is re-
regulation and increasing non-trade related protectionism in the triad. The latter 
is reinforced by trends towards relocation of industries, new technology and 
financial capital among members of the triad, while it is only in the regional 
East Asian division of labor a new economics of scale is emerging - or what has 
been termed the open regionalism.2
 
For states located in ASEAN,3 the fundamental question is how to cope with 
these changes. The era of American dominance is not only declining in 
Southeast Asia but seems to be overtaken by a much more complex web of 
power relations. China’s access to WTO further complicates and challenges the 
East Asian open regionalism imperative. The region is probably the most 
heterogenous in the world both in terms of geography, politics, economics and 
culture. Not least Southeast Asia reflects this diversity and this raises the 
question which responses are left for ASEAN? Is it wise to form a new 
exclusive trade group - closed regionalism - or does the socalled 'unity in 
diversity concept' in ASEAN literaly mean that national interests prevail? 
 
Although the financial crisis in 1997 has put a temporary hault on economic 
growth these seemingly contradictory processes are accompanied in the 
ASEAN-states by a move towards ASEAN regionalism which is quite different 
from the conventional regionalism implemented elsewhere. As stated in various 
studies, ASEAN integration schemes are not about integration among ASEAN 
members for forming a "closed or discriminatory trading bloc", but rather a way 
for individual countries to co-operate to increase their international 
competitiveness and integration with the world. In this sense, the ultimate 
objective of ASEAN regionalism is to increase the region's competitive edge as 
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a production base geared toward the global market. On the other hand, ASEAN 
integration is a means to create an enlarged regional market for attracting 
inflows of trade and investment. This is because the economies of scale 
generated by ASEAN integration have enhanced its attractiveness as an 
investment location or a production platform for global markets as well as the 
regional market. Economic integration in ASEAN is largely market driven, so 
ASEAN does not focus solely on the region but is also globally oriented. It is 
clear that the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), ASEAN Industrial Cooperation 
Scheme (AICO), the regional Framework Agreement on Services Facilitation 
(AFAS), and the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) and other initiatives are driven 
primarily by the recognition by ASEAN of the necessity to continue to sharpen 
its international competitiveness. Therefore, ASEAN states are integrating 
among themselves in order to integrate with the world, and AFTA, AIA, as well 
as AFAS could be a means for achieving this. 
 
Thus, it is not surprising that the rationale of ASEAN integration is not primarily 
to pursue a rising share of intra-regional trade in its total trade, but rather to 
develop the free flow of goods and mobilization of investment intra-ASEAN. In 
consequence, it facilitates a further degree of market integration so that ASEAN 
would be increasingly attractive as an area of trade and investment in the global 
economy. This is the meaning of the open regionalism approach adopted by 
ASEAN.4
 
However, the crisis also showed that both APEC and ASEAN were “incapable 
of making immediate short-term palliative responses to the regional financial 
crises”, and this “posed serious questions about their efficacy as emergent 
models of regional organization in Asia and the Pacific.”5 Perceptions of 
ASEAN as ineffective and a "sunset organization" have consistently been noted 
and after the crisis urgent calls to restore international confidence in the 
grouping rang out loud. Its institutional and geopolitical weaknesses, and its 
current politico-social upheavals, have added real urgency for ASEAN to look 
for a new impetus, which could perhaps be found in a bigger East Asian 
grouping.6 In order to provide an adequate answer to these questions it is 
necessary to situate the region in a historical and global perspective. 
 
There are two fundamental responses to the recent dramatic changes in the 
international and regional political economy. Taking into consideration that the 
global governance system is in a systemic legitimacy crisis the first response is 
located at the national level, and the second at the regional level. 
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The contemporary world economy is increasingly being transformed for the 
coming era in which butter will be far more vital than guns, and competition 
among major capitalist powers intensifies. As the hegemonic role of the US 
declines further, the Japanese and the EU are expected to grow relative to the 
American position. Hence it creates a US-Europe-Japan tripolarity resulting in 
strong economic rivalry among these three major powers but leaving the 
majority in the South with decreasing opportunities and room of maneouvre. 
Furthermore, China ascendancy to becoming a global player is urging Southeast 
Asia to rethink its future. 
 
The global economy is now characterized by a transnational division of labor, 
where power is centered on the US, EU, Japan and to a lesser degree China. 
Industrial production is restructured and internationalized key sectors such as the 
oil giants, car companies, and electrical goods are expanding production 
facilities to cheaper locations. Most recently there has been a shift of 
manufacturing to Southeast Asia and China. But at the same time as capital 
internationalize core nations come together by forming administrative, political 
and security coalitions on a regional basis. 
 
Western European integration is a major factor contributing to the rise of 
regionalism. One of the reasons for the formation of the EU-bloc is to respond to 
the rise of Japan and the United States, and to serve as a catalytic force in the 
competition for world markets. At present the EU's reliance on trade with 
nonmembers is rather limited. 
 
In the 1990s, exchanges between countries belonging to the EU and NAFTA 
already accounted for almost 60 percent of world trade. Compared with the fact 
that Japan, the largest economy in Asia, is unlikely to become the major 
absorber of the region's manufactured exports in the near future, the scope of 
any intra-regional integration scheme will likely be quite limited in East and 
Southeast Asia. Although some scholars are rather optimistic with regard to the 
scope for new regional arrangements especially after the crisis and China’s 
accession to the WTO others are rather pessimistic due to a number of factors 
which I will stress in the following.  
 
The threat of growing protectionism in the form of regional blocs has been most 
evident recently by the creation of NAFTA. The trend in the US Trade Acts of 
1984 and 1988 is giving increased discrimination power to the administration to 
regulate imports by putting emphasis on reciprocity and bilateralism. In 1988, 
the US Congress withdrew the benefits of the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) from Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea. In 
1989, it went further, labelling Japan as an 'unfair trader' under the provisions of 
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (better known as Super 301),7 and 
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reportedly only left South Korea and Taiwan off the list because of some 
market-opening measures on their part. In 1993 Thailand and Malaysia were 
threatened with similar measures unless they improved the situation on nontrade 
issues such as workers- and human rights. As such, protectionism is becoming 
even more systematic and nontariff barriers (NTBs) increasingly used to restrict 
imports. And the recent crisis has seen an additional number of demands aimed 
at restructuring the economies away from statism towards a more liberalized 
Anglo-Saxon type of economy. The September 11 terrorist attack has added 
pressures on the Bush administration to impose protective tariffs. This has been 
done on steel and the US' export of hormone-treated beef and genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs) shows an emerging resurgent trade unilateralism. 
The reality is that the US and the EU will never abandon the massive 
subsidization of their rich farming interests, the effective protection of their 
textile and garment sectors, and their monopolistic control of technology via the 
TRIPs agreement. On the contrary all tendencies point in the opposite direction. 
 
The related question in the East and Southeast Asian context is where Japan fits 
into the emerging international and regional economy? Is Japan going to be the 
new locomotive, the new major absorbing market in a world economy with 
surplus capacity? 
 
ASEAN's dependence on Japan extends to investment and overseas 
development assistance (ODA) as well as trade. Achieving economic influence 
can be applied to explain the motivation behind the Japanese government's 
strategic use of foreign economic policy as well as certain aspects of the 
bilateral relationship. ASEAN's policymakers are receptive to Japanese 
economic assistance in the form of aid, grants and technological cooperation of 
any kind - a situation which creates an unequal “partnership”. 
 
Japan has been reluctant to lead any Asian response to EU and NAFTA. 
Although some factors like the AMF proposal might suggest otherwise there 
seems little reason to expect a closing off of East Asia. The region is anything 
but uniform. Its countries have no common heritage, are split between various 
modes of political regimes at different stages of growth, and are adverse to 
leadership by any single country. Nevertheless, there seems to be not only a 
regional but a global expectation to Japan that she assumes a role commensurate 
with her economic strength.  
 
Furthermore both China and Japan are important centers of what Katzenstein 
terms the “new Asian regionalism, but also counterweights against the influence 
of the United States.”8 Seen in this light expectations are high, but the conditions 
for regional governance weak and not likely to emerge in the near future except 
if the United States takes a leading position as it has done in APEC. 
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3. ASEAN, AFTA, EAEC and AMF: Regional defensive responses 
The answer to the changes in the global economy on the part the member-states 
of ASEAN has been the adoption of various defensive measures, such as the 
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir's proposal of creating the East Asia 
Economic Group (EAEG).9 This grouping changed its name in the 1990s to the 
East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) under Japanese leadership and American 
exclusion. However, Mahathir's proposal clearly resembles a 1988 response 
from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs which came up with the idea of 
an East Asia Economic Ring (EAER).10 Many of the details of EAEC are not yet 
available. But public statements by its proponents emphasize the following: 
 
1) EAEC is intended to be a consultative forum. Memberstates can use 
EAEC to discuss, on an ongoing basis trade and economic issues of 
mutual interest.  
 
2) EAEC is not intended to be a trade bloc but consistent with GATT and 
WTO rules and contribute to the success of the Uruguay Round in its 
attempt to maintain and enhance the global trading system.  
 
3) EAEC will not create trade barriers to imports from third countries but 
explore all areas of potentially productive cooperation across the whole 
spectrum of economic interrelationships.  
 
US opposition to EAEC prevents the implementation of an organizational 
structure or even a schedule of meetings. Therefore the result remains unclear. 
Although the crisis in 1997 did result in proposals for ‘monetary regionalism’ 
and a renewed collective East Asian identity which might result in what Breslin 
and Higgott terms “potential roles for nascent regional organisations” it remains 
to be seen whether new substantial initiatives will be taken. 
 
This is also the case with the former Thai Prime Minister Anand's 1992-
suggestion to create AFTA for manufactured goods within a 15 years period 
through the progressive lowering of tariffs blocking the movement of goods 
within the group. There are several motives behind forming AFTA;11 all of them 
essentially involve the perception in ASEAN countries that world trade today is 
being managed in various forms, especially by the regional blocs in Europe and 
North America. Under the AFTA-scheme ASEAN decided to reduce tariffs on 
manufactured products to 5 percent or less. The implementation of this proposal 
is not without complications. 
 
Sree Kumar notes that a major obstacle as seeen in former similar initiatives is 
the fact that ASEAN countries, "tend to compete for similar investments and 
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access to the same markets."12 While the value of intra-ASEAN trade increased 
to $25.3 billion in 1990 from $12.9 billion in 1980, it has barely kept up with the 
rise in ASEAN trade with the rest of the world, which totalled $268 billion in 
1990. "As a proportion of the group's total trade, intra-ASEAN commerce stood 
around 20 percent in 1990, little changed from a decade earlier."13 Nearly 
16.000 items were included in an ASEAN preferential trading arrangement 
(PTA) signed in 1977. Most of these were put there because of their low 
demand. For instance, snow plows, of no use in the tropics, are on the list. 
However impressive, it has not increased preferential trade in ASEAN which 
remained at 1 percent of total intra-ASEAN trade.14 All empirical studies on the 
likely impact of the PTA on intra-regional trade confirm that the effects of the 
tariff cuts have been minimal,15 and the situation has not changed in 2000 where 
apart from Malaysia no states in ASEAN export more than 20 percent within the 
region.  
 
The 2008 deadline for the creation of AFTA has later on been moved forward to 
2003. Over the course of the next several years, the program of tariff reductions 
was broadened and accelerated, and a host of "AFTA Plus" activities were 
initiated, including efforts to eliminate non-tariff barriers and quantitative 
restrictions, and harmonize customs nomenclature, valuation, and procedures, 
and develop common product certification standards. In addition, ASEAN later 
signed framework agreements for the intra-regional liberalization of trade in 
services, and for regional Intellectual Property Rights cooperation. An industrial 
complementation scheme designed to encourage intra-regional investment was 
approved, and discussions were held on creating a free investment area within 
the region. During the financial crisis of 1997-98, ASEAN reaffirmed its 
commitment to AFTA, and as part of a series of "bold measures," agreed that the 
original six AFTA signatories would accelerate many planned tariff cuts by one 
year, to 2002 from 2003. Although the lowering of tariffs to minimal levels was 
accompanied by a massive expansion of intra-regional trade from US$44.2 
billion in 1993 to US$97.8 billion in 2000 the success of AFTA is still very 
much in its infancy due to important exceptions and resitance in governments 
and bureaucracies - a problem which is illustrated by the fact that “If Singapore 
is excluded, intra-regional trade country ratios are below 10 per cent for all the 
countries, and the intensity is only 1.5. Even including it, the shares are 20-30 
per cent, well below those of Mercosur. Asean is not of major trading 
importance to any of its members, although on average more important than 
SADC.”16
 
Although ASEAN has generated an extensive interactive network of 
governmental and private agencies, regional economic cooperation is still slow, 
especially in the crucial areas of trade liberalization and industrial production. 
For instance, in spite of the ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement and 
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Complementation Scheme, intra-ASEAN exports increased marginally from 
16.7 percent in 1980 to 17.4 percent in 1989, which largely reflected Singapore-
Malaysia and Singapore-Indonesia trade. In fact, the share of exports from the 
Philippines and Thailand to other ASEAN countries declined. Furthermore, 
there have been attempts of politically initiated microregionalisms in the form of 
growth triangles, but so far these initiatives have been conducted on a bilateral 
and only had a limited effect. 
 
But more important than formal agreement, nontariff barriers in the ASEAN 
countries pose an even higher impediment to intra-trade than tariff levels. 
Customs rules and practices are not uniform and are difficult to interpret in 
many ASEAN countries. 
 
The general problem inherent in the various responses of the ASEAN member-
states, individually as well as a regional group, has been the tendency to shy 
away from more substantive areas such as harmonization of trade and 
investment policies or macro-economic coordination.17 Regional cooperation 
has generally focused on a relatively shallow level of cooperation in trade, 
industrial development, environment management and exchange of information. 
Furthermore, the ASEAN framework is not governed by any legal or legislative 
agreement, in the form of a treaty. On the contrary, the arrangement is loose and 
flexible, and is generally based on a simple memorandum of understanding. 
Finally, nationalism continues to prevail over regional interests. For instance, 
when the United States offered ASEAN preferential trade benefits, similar to 
those extended to Mexico and the Caribbean, the ASEAN countries insisted that 
Washington sign six separate treaties with them. The US offer was subsequently 
shelved.18 Recently the US and the EU signed a very favorable bilateral trade 
agreement with Singapore which together with Chile, Jordan and Israel now 
enjoy free access to the American and European markets - not exactly a move 
endorsed by other ASEAN members. 
 
These examples show the vulnerability of the lack of binding agreements, but at 
the same time it is the export oriented development strategy which is at stake. 
 
The factors threatening export-led FDI dependent growth menace are of supply 
and demand. On the demand side, the menace to the absorbtion of exports from 
Japan, the NICs and Would-be-NICs by the US, has been pointed out as a 
principal reason. Another and even far more important cause is overcapacity on 
a world scale. The economic rationale and impetus for absorption of exports 
from the NICs and Would-be-NICs is contrary to political sentiments. The 
newly emerging countries on the basis of an export-led growth strategy have 
now to compete with the industrialized countries in supplying high quality and 
competitive manufactures. This problem also seems to be one of the major 
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impediments to closer regional economic cooperation in ASEAN, because the 
economies are not competitive, but rather rely on a complementary export-
oriented strategy with the same productlines and sectors. Competition occurs on 
the level of attracting FDI and foreign capital in general, but as shown above 
also in signing exclusive trade agreements with the the developed countries. 
 
The member countries who make up ASEAN have a combined GDP of nearly 
700 billion US$, but large disparities among them. With a population of 498 
million people and a US$ 1.164 per capita income they make up one of the 
largest regional markets in the world, but pales when compared to Japan's 123.5 
million people with a GNP of US$2.990 billion or US$24.213 per capita. The 
move to AFTA will have a limited effect on world trade and will not dismantle 
GATT's and WTO's multilateralism. In 1991, the share of ASEAN in world 
trade was only 4.6 percent and this has increased only slightly and has relied to a 
very significant degree on FDI. Moreover, ASEAN countries will not overly 
emphasize intra-ASEAN trade since the role of exchanges with nonmembers is 
of greater importance. Therefore, it is appropriate to define AFTA and EAEC as 
extra-national possibilities. National development objectives still play the 
determining role when a choice is available. The conditions in East Asia 
(referring to Japan, the NICs, and ASEAN) do not satisfy a number of basic 
prerequisites for regional integration or economic regionalism.19 Indeed ASEAN 
seems to favor closer cooperation rather than economic integration,20 and in a 
new regionalism perspective it involves a dramatic shift away from South-South 
regional cooperation to North- South regionalisms and multiple competing 
regionalisms.21
 
This was illustrated in the aftermath of the financial crisis where the IMF not 
only led but in effect monopolized the international rescue effort, with 
conspicuously little regional coordination, and with the World Bank and the 
Asian Development Bank in distinctly subordinate roles. Japan's August 1997 
proposal for a $100 billion Asia Monetary Fund, with pledges mostly from 
Japan, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore, was shot down by the US 
Treasury, not wanting a competitor to the IMF outside of its control. The Asia 
Fund could probably have deterred the currency runs and stopped the crisis from 
becoming even a fraction of what it has become, because speculating against a 
currency backed by $100 billion is altogether less attractive than speculating 
against one backed by only $25 billion. The Treasury's failure to support it was a 
major mistake as regards dealing with the crisis, if not in terms of US foreign 
policy objectives in Asia.22
 
As a defense against Washington's poor international assistance record, 
American officials claim that the United States bears a disproportionate burden 
of the bill for international institutions and that more of the burden should be 
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shifted to other wealthy nations like Germany and Japan. They also point out 
that the United States does at least as much if not more by keeping its markets 
open and by providing military defense. All this is true. But the irony of the US 
position is that over the past decade or two Washington has blocked various 
proposals that would have reallocated the costs among the major Western 
nations and put these institutions on a sounder financial footing. It did so 
because the measures threatened America's preeminent position-and in the case 
of the IMF and the World Bank, its de facto veto, since increasing Japan's and 
Germany's allocations would have increased their weighted vote.  
 
Washington has preferred cash-strapped international agencies it could easily 
control to stronger ones in which the US was less dominant. This American 
focus on dominance was most evident at the beginning of the Asian financial 
crisis, when Washington reflexively vetoed the Japanese AMF proposal, fearing 
that it would pose a threat to America's financial dominance and to the centrality 
of the IMF, which it controls. In short, it preferred to risk further financial 
meltdown than to sanction a potential rival to America's dominant position.23
 
If the conditions and the political will for successful regional integration are 
lacking in the East Asian context it leaves only the state as the main actor and 
catalyst at the politico-economic level. The politically insulated nature and 
bounded autonomy of the state in ASEAN resembles in appearance that of the 
NICs but not the character itself. In spite of important differences between the 
member-states in terms of influence from the business sector on economic 
policy-making there are important similarities as well when compared with the 
NICs and this helps to explain the reluctance towards a more formal integration 
scheme in ASEAN. 
 
4. Catch-up or be left behind 
The argument that the features explaining high economic growth of the ASEAN 
countries can be attributed mainly to the role of the domestic state, and not 
ASEAN per se, or its subsequent free trade area AFTA is not a new one. It 
might even be claimed that seen from Southeast Asia the most appropriate 
answer to the regionalization of the world economy is strengthening of state 
capacities and capabilities. This is illustrated by the extremely high rates of 
investment in domestic physical capital. In this respect, the countries of the 
region have been following the path trodden earlier by Japan. The absence of 
regional formal institutional mechanisms for extensive policy coordination, 
forced even senior officials, such as the Prime Minister of Singapore Goh Chok 
Tong, to declare in 1999 that “ASEAN as a group is being seen as helpless and 
worse, disunited …in our summits in 1997 and 1998, we failed to convince the 
outside world that ASEAN was tackling the crisis with determination and 
decisiveness to regain its high [regional] growth”. Rodolfo Severino, the 
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Secretary General of ASEAN, went as far as to state that “the frustration and 
bewilderment over the sudden reversal of fortunes have led many, including 
some in Southeast Asia itself, to raise questions about ASEAN’s effectiveness 
and utility and about the validity of the very idea of ASEAN”. The shared 
regional identity, based on the theme of increasing economic development, was 
being questioned by even those who had championed it in the past.24  
 
The important role of state policies is further seen from the priority given to 
growth-related objectives, such as increasing productivity and competitiveness 
and promotion of industrialization policy since the 1960s. The state in ASEAN, 
also, plays an active role in capital accumulation through state enterprises and 
government participation in joint public-private ventures. However, the global 
recession in the mid-1980s, somehow changed the heavy reliance on state 
capital in favor of the new catch-words: liberalization, privatization and 
deregulation. But still, the role of state capital plays a significant role albeit a 
changing one to more interventionist policies and state-led developmentalism. 
 
Therefore, it seems appropriate to consider why ASEAN, untill the financial 
crisis in July 1997, have had such striking growth rates over the last decade 
compared to most other parts of the world, except the NICs, as well as an 
impressive level of real growth in capital formation. Five main factors are 
among the most important growth-promoting elements in the economic 
expansion of ASEAN countries: 
 
1) Embedded autonomy of state policies and efforts to promote 
industrialization. 
2) Increase of FDI, particularly from the US, Japan and the NICs. 
3) Increase of exports. 
4) Decline in competitiveness of the NICs. 
5) Increased regional political stability. 
 
Before the onset of the crisis in 1997, East and Southeast Asian leaders 
(including Japan) deliberately encouraged economic growth by emphasizing 
international competition through a calculated export-led strategy and avoidance 
of social welfare programs. 
 
By putting 'politics in command’ the CDS in East Asia played an important role 
in the capitalist growth process. The East Asian late industrialization 
development model was based on the implementation of a specific 
understanding of political economy, whereby the state assumed a function in the 
guidance of the economy without disregarding the importance of the market. 
Government policy-making was thus organically tied to the production factors - 
land, labor and capital - in actively creating comparative advantages. Before the 
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crisis neo-Listian theory enabled a clear explanation and provided the definition 
of the East Asian CDS which had “a role different from that of the Keynesian 
welfare state in the already advanced countries. The Keynesian welfare state 
serves to restrain market rationality by measures to protect groups vulnerable to 
the consequences of market rationality. By contrast the developmentalist state 
restrains market rationality in order to pursue a policy of industrialization per 
se.”25 But the export-oriented strategy came to an impasse. During the Cold War 
the White House offered free access to the US market to handful non-communist 
economies in the region. Today competition has become harsh among Asian 
economies, and not least the Chinese shift to a labor-intensive EOI strategy has 
left the region with a drive downwards on prices and profits, and in any case, 
there is overproduction in almost any productive sector in the real economy 
relative to the decline of outlets on the European and US markets. Furthermore, 
the CDS with its embedded autonomy became its own gravedigger. The very 
success of the developmental state in structuring the accumulation of industrial 
capital changed the nature of relations between private capital and the state. As 
private capital became less dependent on the resources provided by the state, the 
latter’s dominance diminished. The zaibatzus and chaebols became the new 
masters and coupled with resurgent distributional demands the elite networks 
and bureaucratic structures the state became transformed into a new type of 
regulatory institution.26
 
The real issue is what Ankie Hoogvelt convincingly argues that there is a 
historical trend towards forms of production organization in which capital no 
longer needs to pay for the reproduction of labor power. At the same time, 
participation in the global marketplace means that the domestic market is no 
longer needed to serve the self-expansion of capital. Jobless growth is what the 
present phase of capitalism is all about. “It is this process of globalization rather 
than any claimed imbalance in the national accounts between public and private 
sector growth (the fiscal deficit), nor any demographic imbalance (the greying 
population) that is the main reason for the perceived need to shed and restructure 
the welfare state which has become the dominant political project in all 
advanced countries since the 1980s.”27 Coupled with the fact that there is a “race 
to the bottom” in terms of job flight as mentioned at a recent conference for East 
Asian union leaders hosted by the AFL-CIO: “As soon as we start to organize a 
union, the company threatens to move to Vietnam,” and it was an unanimous 
view that international regulations are needed to keep companies from moving 
to low-wage economies28 - the result is that East and Southeast Asia appear to be 
approaching what can be termed classical problems of Europe and the United 
States.  
 
When the scope of analysis is extended to include the external factors another 
complimentary picture emerge which neither shows a successful emulation nor 
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implementation of a strategy of 'guided economy' or 'capitalist developmental 
state'.29 It has been pointed out by several scholars that, the most important 
constraint on enhancing the developmental capacities and the autonomy of the 
state in ASEAN is to be found in the international context. One example has 
centered on growing protectionism in the core states with the increasing 
tendency towards formation of exclusive trade blocs. In addition there are a 
number of differences between the NICs and Would-be-NICs which limit the 
strength of Southeast Asian state responses to changes in the international 
economy. The most important difference is the problem that contrary to the 
experience of the Newly Industrialized Countries ASEAN’s dependency on 
foreign investment, technology, and financial capital has been extremely high.30 
Furthermore, there is a consistent pressure from the multilateral institutions, the 
World Bank, IMF and WTO for a premature opening of the domestic markets. 
Indeed the increased economic integration has been more oriented towards the 
creation of a common external trade policy than with intra-regional economic 
liberalization. Some analysts have argued that most of the member states 
continue their commitment to the regional organization because they perceived 
their international influence would be greater as long as they were ASEAN 
members than if they were not. An as mentioned above even AFTA, launched in 
1992 was not implemented until the late 1990s, accelerated by the events of the 
Asian financial crisis. At the same time protected domestic industries were 
permitted to continue and flourish under a myriad of sectoral agreements.  
 
Relatedly, it was the Yen appreciation that expanded the growth area from Japan 
to the NICs and the ASEAN countries. Japan's FDI in Southeast Asia is aimed at 
constructing a world base for production and export, taking advantage of the low 
production costs and government incentives. Following the Plaza-Agreement a 
new upsurge in FDI from the NICs took place. This trend reflects a decline in 
competitiveness of the NICs due to high appreciations of national currencies. 
Finally, Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia and prospects for peace in 
Indochina combined with the peaceful transitions in the Philippines from the 
Marcos regime to Aquino increased regional stability. This situation changed 
dramatically in the aftermath of the financial crisis leaving the region in turmoil 
and especially affecting regional and local stability and human security in 
Indonesia and the Philippines and to a lesser degree Thailand. 
 
5. Some perspectives 
As this paper has tended to show, the regional response in Southeast Asia to 
changes in the world order and the international division of labor has had limited 
effects. EAEC and AFTA are defensive acts as the focus of individual states 
remains on national development. There are other options both at the regional 
and national level; such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and 
the increasing emphasis on state supported regional growth triangles. But again 
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these examples are either through cooperation among states or require a strong 
role of the state in providing infrastructure, tax incentives etc. They are extra-
national and do not figure among the highest priorities on the development-
agenda in these states. Another related problem is very basic, because 
governments cannot emphasize three or more competing regional alternatives at 
the same time. AFTA (ASEAN), EAEC and APEC are in contradiction and 
remains in a competitive situation leaving policy elites to prioritize the national 
alternative. 
 
Although ASEAN regionalism is based on the theoretical assumption of the 
equality of states, in practice, the larger ASEAN states have come to exert 
greater influence over the regional organization. The discussion of equality of 
states becomes rhetoric when regional interest is subsumed under individual 
national interest which dictates that the ultimate goals of the state be pursued by 
various means. The prime example, of course, is that Indonesia has been 
unanimously accepted as the leader of ASEAN in regional affairs. This is 
testified by a number of ASEAN's decisions, which included the location of the 
ASEAN secretariat in Jakarta, the appointment of an Indonesian as the first 
secretary general of ASEAN, the holding of the first ASEAN summit in Bali 
and, untill his ouster, the recognition of President Suharto as the elder statesman 
in Southeast Asia.31
 
As regional trade blocs in the North enhance liberal trade within their own 
boundaries they do so, obviously, at the expense of nonmember nations and 
threaten to divert preexisting patterns of trade, i.e. they capture market shares 
that formerly went to, say, Southeast Asia. It remains to be seen if the new WTO 
rounds will increase multilateralism and free trade or protectionism in the North 
will prevail.32
 
It is essential to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the previous 
development strategies. It is also important to understand the challenges of 
globalization to these economies and polities. One noteworthy factor appears to 
be that the crisis in many cases was not caused by over-involvement of Asian 
governments in economic development. Rather, the crisis has been most severe 
where Asian governments were retreating from leading roles in the economy, 
while their capabilities for indirectly managing national economic problems 
remained insufficient. Thus, evaluation of the economic performances of 
democratizing governments in East Asia might be of interest. 
 
Partly caused by the economic difficulties, Asian democracies have become 
generally unstable; Philippine and Indonesian Presidents were forced to resign; 
South Korean and Taiwanese Presidents face strong domestic challenges; and 
Japanese Prime Minister Mori resigned amid economic and political turmoil. 
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The most important issue of ASEAN regionalization is to generate a common 
political will of ASEAN countries to agree to the implementation of deeper 
integration in the region. Over three decades, ASEAN countries have preferred 
to have their commitment based on "consensus" and have provided loose 
framework-agreements with flexible practice rather than a concrete legally 
binding regime. This is the main obstacle to the upgrading of ASEAN regional 
integration, as evidenced by the modest success in economic co-operation of 
ASEAN in the past. 
 
6. Regionalism and the impact of the Financial Crisis 
 
The final part of this paper focuses on the following four problems: 
 
- general overview of the key issues in the region;  
 
- identifying the most important actors in formal and informal regional 
governance regimes;  
 
- relating the implications of one and two above (key actors and key issues) to 
possibilities and limitations to more accountable, legitimate and transparent 
governance;  
 
- connections with other cluster areas i.e. finance and foreign investment + 
human development and security. 
 
Regarding question one and two the key actors and key issues in the region are 
related to the following: 
 
a) Bilateral and to a lesser degree multilateral bargaining, negotiations and 
agreements both in terms of labor issues and migration, and more important in 
terms of investment and trade form the top priority of East and Southeast Asia. 
These processes are performed by the state/government elites in an unequal 
reciprocal fashion. There are instances of growing influence by the business 
sectors on almost all policy/governance issues of some substance although the 
military also performs a role not only in security, but also in business affairs. 
This is the case in the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos and 
Myanmar/Cambodia and to a much lesser degree in China, Korea and Taiwan. 
Trade unions are weak allover the region except in Korea and to a lesser a 
degree in the Philippines. In tandem with the crisis organized labor has gained 
strength in Thailand and even more in Indonesia, but contrary to big business 
labor is not well organized at the regional level. Finally, the new social 
movements (civil society?) have exploded both in terms of numbers at the 
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national levels, but also in terms of becoming a force to be recogned with at the 
regional level. 
 
b) North-South regionalism examplified by the emphasis on ASEM, and 
attempts to “multiple regionalism(s)” i.e. ASEAN, AFTA, EAEC, APEC 
showing that the region in a positive version is “experimenting” with all forms 
of institutional arrangements in order to stay comtetitive and attractive to the 
new hegemon “international footlose financial and productive capital”. In a 
negative sense the players in the region have been scrambling to explore 
appropriate responses to better facilitate and accomodate to the new laws of 
international mobile capital. As such the main emphasis in ASEAN and 
membership of AFTA is to reduce risks of foreign investment by providing 
multi-country credibility to regulations concerning trade and capital flows. 
However, in the early 1990s, ASEAN received almost 67% of all FDI flowing 
into Asia. Now, 75% of the capital going into developing East Asia is destined 
for China and Hong Kong, compared to only 10% going to ASEAN. The result 
of all this has been multiple regionalism and some instances of micro-
regionalism. One example which has gone virtually unnoticed by the rest of the 
world is that East Asian countries have also been collaborating to create other 
economic arrangements. As a result, for the first time in history, the world might 
in theory enter a three-block configuration. With very little fanfare, Asia created 
the "ASEAN + 3" (Japan, China, and Korea) in 1997. The group has held its 
own summits for four years in a row, has set up a "vision group" to guide its 
work, and holds regular meetings of its finance ministers. Many Asians believe 
that Western banks and companies deliberately caused the Asian crisis of 1997 
for quick profits. Thus, it is not surprising to note that ASEAN + 3 is moving 
more rapidly on financial issues than on trade. For example, the group has 
announced several new initiatives to help its members deal with future Asian 
crises. Such measures include a regionwide system of currency swaps, the 
aforementioned Asian Monetary Fund, and an Asian currency unit modeled on 
the euro. 
 
c) The role of FDIs in the ASEAN economies in particular coincided with the 
main objective of the first phase of industrialization then which was to create 
employment for a fast expanding population. This phase therefore saw the 
expansion of “unskilled labour-intensive” manufacturing while the second phase 
represents a clear effort to shift to a more ‘skill-intensive” manufacturing. As a 
result, since the 1970s, manufacturing became the main engine of growth in 
these countries dominated by textiles and electronics. Competition for foreign 
capital is therefore unavoidable under these circumstances. Measures to attract 
foreign investment include ensuring political stability, the supply of a docile and 
cheap labor force, infrastructural support services, a series of incentives and tax 
holidays and of late the promise to supply a highly skilled workforce. Countries 
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that were politically stable, where wages were low, with a good infra-structural 
support and a well controlled workforce then became magnets for FDIs. It is no 
surprise therefore that within the developing world, the fast growing NIEs 
(South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) has been most successful in 
attracting foreign capital.33 Other Asian countries including the ASEAN-4 
(Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines) in the strife towards 
achieving NIE status took similar measures. Untill the crisis started East and 
Southeast Asia have had two regulatory mechanisms in terms of labor markets 
and migration. The first has been the acceptance of labor import and the other of 
sending workers abroad. They allowed foreign workers into their metropolitan 
areas, while on the other hand, they were exporting labor from rural 
communities. According to one interpretation the socalled miracle has been 
build on the shoulders of exploited and marginalized migrant labor and both 
official and unofficial statistics reveil an astonishing number of migrants who 
worked as construction workers, maids prostitutes, and in 3D jobs (dirty, 
difficult, dangerous) etc. in the metroples of the region (in 1980 approx. one 
million a number which swelled to 6.5 million in 1997). This all changed with 
the crisis which left the region in turmoil and a state of depression. Mass 
migration entered the agenda of policymakers as an attractive way to cope with 
the impact of the crisis and started a search for overseas labor markets to cope 
with the crisis. However, this initiative was met with decisive moves to control 
migration. Furthermore receiving countries in the region immediately 
announced repatriation of foreign workers, increased surveillance at the borders 
seemingly implied that migrants were at least partly responsible for the crisis. 
For receiving countries renationalization of labor markets and employment was 
a matter of putting nationals first over foreigners. For labor exporting countries, 
the “internationalization” of their workforce (via overseas employment) was one 
of several strategies to deal with unemployment.  
 
d) In terms of intersubjective meanings and identities the elite in the region has 
with few exceptions endorsed developmental paternalism as the norm and value 
which should provide political-cultural exceptionism, excuse and explanation 
for the fact that repression and outlawing of alternative discourses have been the 
actual policy no matter the type of regime or governance be it democratic or 
authoritarian. This has had an anormous impact on gender and the crisis has 
enhanced the male dominance of the region in almost all matters concerned with 
policy-making/governance issues. Furthermore in many countries there is a 
latent anti-Chinese sentiment which in the case of Indonesia exploded looting, 
violence, death and a mass exodus of ethnic Chinese. 
 
Regarding the implications of the above on possibilities of formal and informal 
governance and especially linking the issues to trade/investment and 
welfare/security are plenty and complex and raise a number of issues including 
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economic stability, social cohesion, poverty alleviation, food security and 
unemployment. Exploring new approaches to deal with these issues also means 
considering the structural role migrant workers play in the regional labor market, 
and the consequences for such admission. 
 
The Cold War rethoric should be reversed and political parties with a social 
democratic and/or left wing bias allowed - not only in order to give working 
classes, migrants and other marginalized groups and strata a real alternative in 
the form of political representation, but also to give access to a growing and 
increasingly militant NGO community a choice and an articulated political voice 
which might impact national and subsequently regional governance. 
 
This also implies a radical rupture in the elite’s approach to the role of labor 
unions, which might enable the negotiation of a new social contract - i.e. as the 
old statist corporatism is disappearing it remains to be seen what will replace it. 
 
Whatever issue related to labor, migration and socialo policy is examined, 
regional cooperation surfaces as necessary. However as mentioned above the 
political climate for such action is still lacking. There is a dialogue between 
various small and rather insignificant regional NGO's (Asian Solidarity 
Dialogue and the Asia Pacific People’s Assembly), some global civil society 
movements such as the International Organization for Migration, and 
multilateral bodies like ILO and ADB, but their initiatives are met with old style 
paternalism and aversion from regional bodies like APEC and ASEAN. 
 
In conclusion East and Southeast Asian countries differ considerably in their 
approaches to governance, not only in terms of cultural identities, but also in 
ideologies, political institutions and levels of economic development, the policy 
elates share an aversion against organized labor and regard migrants as an extra-
ressource - a reserve-army without basic human rights as defined by the UN. 
Furthermore, the crisis has raised fundamental questions about political stability, 
declining middle classes, the role of the state and not least the military (the 
Philippines recently experienced a military coup against Estrada, and the 
military remains an important player in Indonesia), a more articulate and 
outspoken civil society, and basically prospects for democratization allover the 
region. Popular support may not be essential or ascertainable in Asean, but 
ethnic and religious fundamentalism is replacing pluralism and might change 
prospects for interregional attempts of governance in the near future (Indonesia 
and Malaysia are prime examples). 
 
Other governance questions such as accountability and transparency are highly 
affected by the above mentioned problems. What is most probable is an 
indigenous solution as anti-American sentiments are growing in the region - as 
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such the IMF and the World Bank is blamed for putting gasoline on the fire - a 
situation which does not imply prospects for the adoption of American-style 
governance and economic systems. 
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